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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/05/2006 Accident number: 128 
Accident time: 11:10 Accident Date: 18/03/1998 




Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: dry/dusty 
grass/grazing area 
hard 
Date record created: 13/02/2004 Date  last modified: 13/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
dog missed mine (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
pressure to work quickly (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
1 
Accident report 
An accident report was made on behalf of the UN MAC and made briefly available in 
September 1999. The following summarises its content. 
The accident occurred on land classed as "agricultural" and described as "medium" hard. A 
photograph of the site showed hard, dry ground with patches of coarse grass. The victim had 
been a deminer for two years and had last attended a revision course sixteen months before. 
It was 41 days since the last time off. The device was identified as an PMN by fragments 
found at the site.  
On the day of the accident the team were delayed by two punctures on the way to the site 
and arrived late (10:45). The dog-set's task was to check a breaching/boundary lane. 
The victim said that the dogs checked a leash length (8m) and both dogs indicated a suspect 
point. The point was investigated and the fuse of a mortar was found. He was checking the 
second leash at a distance of 11 metres from the first when he stepped on a mine at 11:10. 
The victim was treated at the site, then transferred to ICRC hospital in Kandahar, and from 
there to hospital in Peshawar, Kandahar. 
A preliminary accident report seen in July 1998 stated that the victim "worked one leash then 
he started for the second leash from the same place, while the procedure is that the second 
leash should be started one metre back from the cleared area…" 
The victim stated that his dog missed the mine, and also that the Team Leader and the Set 
Leader had walked where the accident occurred before he did. He added that there was a 
delay in stemming the bleeding from his leg while colleagues went to fetch a camera with film. 
The Team Leader stated that he was negotiating to keep a shepherd away from the area 
when the accident occurred. The group's set Leader had told him that the victim stepped from 
the safe area [for no obvious reason]. The Team Leader was also the medic and did not 
mention any delay in treatment. 
Two other deminer/surveyors said that the victim caused the accident by his carelessness. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators determined that the accident was caused by either the dog performing badly 
or its handler performing badly by failing to control and "read" his dog properly. They 
considered that poor performance by the mine-dog Set Leader was "obvious". They 
considered that the group might have been rushing in order to make up for lost time caused 
delays caused by the vehicle problems on the way to the task. 
Whether or not the dog was at fault, they found that the handler had ignored safety 
procedures by following the dog into the area when only one dog had checked it. The Set 
Leader should have prevented this. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that dog-handlers only enter the area after it had been 
checked by a second dog, that the Set Leaders should ensure this, that medical staff should 
make every effort to provide medical assistance as soon as possible, and that Set Leaders 
should ensure that cameras with film are on site at all times. They thought that the Set Leader 
should be disciplined, that all mine-dogs sets should have a revision course on survey 




Victim number: 164 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: dog-handler  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: not recorded 
 





Leg Below knee 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
A preliminary report listed the victim's injuries as: "right leg amputated, left leg received 
fragments… left leg broken, right arm got lower injury".  
No formal medical report was in the record in September 1999 (it's absence was noted by the 
accident investigators). 
The victim complained that his field treatment was delayed while his colleagues went 1km to 
another survey team to get a camera with film in it so that his injuries could be photographed 
prior to treatment. The investigators observed that this (if true) indicated "extremely poor 
performance of the team medic".  [Photographs on injuries were required by the insurance 
company at that time.] 
A photograph in the file showed the victim with his left leg lightly bandaged and his sock 
saturated with blood while his right leg was raised to show the amputation (perhaps 10cm 
above the ankle). 
No record of compensation was found in June 1998. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim 
was working improperly and his error went uncorrected.  
If it is true that his supervisors walked over the area prior to him, they set a bad example that 
may indicate that they were inadequately trained for their jobs. Similarly, if the medic delayed 
treatment for a photograph to be taken, he demonstrated a lack of the ability to make an 
appropriate decision about priorities. Both may imply a training need that would be serious 
management failings. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training”. 
Gathering of medical treatment and compensation details was prevented by the UN 
programme manager who denied all access to records in September 1999. Access has 
continued to be denied up to the date of completion of this version of the database. 
3 
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was often 
impossible.  
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